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Introduction
Comparing the task of deciding cases to “brewing a compound (tea)”, Ben-
jamin N. Cardozo, argues that judges use different principles, ingredients and 
tools to formulate a judicial decision (a compound)1. The qualitative and quanti-
tative use of these ingredients varies according to the facts and circumstances 
of each case and the nature of law involved therein. It may happen that while 
one ingredient “X” would play a strong role in a case, its’ relevance in other cases 
would be nominal (or it may play no role at all). The influence of each ingredient 
may also depend upon the “taste of the judge”. If a judge likes “strong tea”, he 
will use one ingredient (which brings such strong taste to the tea) more than the 
other ingredients. However, if a judge likes black tea, then he will not use an 
ingredient (milk) at all. If he likes green tea, he most certainly will use different in-
gredients2. In legal terminology these ingredients are usually referred to as “tools 
of interpretation” which can be categorised as primary and secondary tools3. 
“Foreign law” and “International law” are also tools of interpretation and this pa-
per is an attempt to scrutinize the extent and the manner in which they are used 
within Indian jurisprudence.
Cardozo subsequently divides these principles or ingredients as those which 
judges use consciously and those which they use subconsciously4. Keeping 
this in mind, it becomes pertinent to mention here that the use of foreign law 
and international law as tools of interpretation by constitutional courts in India 
falls within the former category and it is an activity in which these courts engage 
intentionally and on purpose5. Engaging “foreign law” and “international law”, as 
1 caRdozo, Benjamin N., Nature of Judicial Process 10-11 (10th Indian Reprint, 2012) [Hereinafter Car-
dozo 2012].
2 This philosophy can be most associated with Legal Realism, the proponents of which argue that the 
judges decide the cases subjectively and use different legal tools and terminologies to cover-up their sub-
jectivity. The standard account, as put by a legal historian, is this:
“Formalist judges […] assumed that law was objective, unchanging, extrinsic to the social climate, and, 
above all, different from and superior to politics […] The Legal Realists […], tutored by Holmes, Pound, 
and Cardozo, devastated these assumptions […] .They sought to weaken, if not dissolve, the law-politics 
dichotomy, by showing that the act of judging was not impersonal or mechanistic, but rather was neces-
sarily infected by the judges’ personal values.” [Wiecek, William M., 1988, Liberty Under Law: The Supreme 
Court in American Life 187, cited in taManaha, Brian Z., 2009, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 Texas Law 
Review 731].
3 sinGh, G.P., 2010, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (12th ed.).
4 caRdozo, 2012, Supra 2, at 11-12.
5 aBBas, Hakim Yasir, Domestication of International Law in India: A Connubial or a Concubine-al In-
dulgence? – Part 1, SRIL Blog, available at 23 http://srilindia.org/2015/08/23/domestication-of-interna-
tional-law-in-india-a-connubial-or-a-concubine-al-indulgence-part-i/, last seen on 10/12/2017 [Hereinafter 
Abbas SRIL]; tRipathi, P. K., 1957, Foreign Precedents and Constitutional Law 57 Columbia Law Review 
319, 325 [Hereinafter Tripathi 1957]; shankaR, 2010, Shylashri, The Substance of the Constitution: Engag-
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tools of interpretation, is a conscious activity, one in which Indian constitutional 
courts have engaged enthusiastically6. 
The process of using both “foreign law” as well as “international law” as es-
sential ingredient in decision making is in its golden age7. Their use has become 
an essential part of the legal culture in a large number of nations, including India. 
Moreover, their use is also abundant within legal research [by individuals as well 
as governmental and private institutions]. Globalization is one essential factor 
which has influenced the use of non-domestic legal authorities for domestic 
purposes. It has shrunk the world and changed the manner in which human 
beings, corporations and nations interact with each other. And it has done so for 
legal profession8 as well and more so in regards to the manner in which courts 
ing with Foreign Judgments in India, Sri Lanka, and South Africa 2 Drexel Law Review 373, 402 [Hereinafter 
Shankar 2010]; halpéRin, Jean-louis, 2010, Western Legal Transplants and India 2(1) Jindal Global Law 
Review 14, 39 [Hereinafter Halperin 2010]; scotti, Valentina Rita, 2013, India: A Critical Use of Foreign 
Precedents on Constitutional Adjudication, 69 in The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges 
[Tania Groppi and Marie Claire Ponthoreau (eds.)]; vincent, J. Cyril Mathias, 2010, Legal Culture and Legal 
Transplants: The Evolution of the Indian Legal System (With Reference to Private Law), XVIIIth International 
Congress of Comparative Law, Washington DC, available at <http://isaidat.di.unito.it/index.php/isaidat/
article/viewFile/44/50>, last seen on 5/12/2017.
6 aBBas SRIL, Ibid.
7 Glensy, Rex D., 2005, Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign 
Persuasive Authority, 45 Virginia Journal of International Law 357; Jackson, Vicki C., 2003, Transnational 
Discourse, Relational Authority, and the US Court: Gender Equality, 37 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 
271 [While referring to the use of foreign law and international law for domestic purposes she says, “looking 
outward to (such) transnational legal sources to encourage domestic adoption of and compliance with 
gender equality rights is an obvious legal strategy”, Ibid 277]; yeh, Jiunn-Rong, and chanG, Wen-Chen, 
2008, The Emergence of Transnational Constitutionalism: Its Features, Challenges and Solutions, 27 Penn 
State International Law Review 89 [Hereinafter Rong & Chang 2008]; tRuBek, David M., and others, 1994, 
Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of 
Transnational Arenas, 44 Case Western Reserve Law Review 407; hoWaRd, A. E. Dick, 2009, A Traveler 
from an Antique Land: The Modern Renaissance of Comparative Constitutionalism, 50 Virginia Journal 
of International Law 3 [Hereinafter Howard 2009]; hiRschl, Ran, 2010, Comparative Law: The Continued 
Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law, 45 Tulane Law Review 771 [Hereinafter Hirschl 2010].
8 Mak, Elaine, 2014, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalized World: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Changing Practices of Western Highest Courts (1st ed.); shah, Prakash, 2005, Globalisation and the Chal-
lenge of Asian Legal Transplants in Europe, in Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 348; Bell, John, 2014, 
Researching Globalisation: Lessons from Judicial Citations, in Cambridge Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 961; McGinnis, John O., & soMin, Ilya, 2007, Global Constitutionalism: Global Influence 
on U.S. Jurisprudence: Should International Law Be Part of Our Law? 59 Stanford Law Review 1175; 
GelteR, Martin, & sieMs, Mathias, 2012, Networks, Dialogue or One-Way Traffic? An Empirical Analysis 
of Cross-Citations between Ten of Europe’s Highest Courts, 8 Utrecht Law Review 88 [Stating that in a 
globalised world, “law”, which has traditionally been the prerogative of the sovereign nation state, also 
seems to see some cross-border interaction Ibid 88]; yoo, John C., 1999, Globalism and the Constitu-
tion: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 Columbia Law Review 1955, 2004; 
slauGhteR, Anne-Marie, 2003, A Global Community of Courts, 44 Harvard International Law Journal 191; 
l’heuReux-duBe, Claire, 1998, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the 
Rehnquist Court, 34 Tulsa Law Journal 15; chandleR, Jason, 2011, Foreign Law – A Friend of the Court: 
An Argument for Prudent Use of International Law in Domestic, Human Rights Related Constitutional Deci-
sions, 34 Suffolk Transnational Law Journal 117; tushnet, Mark, 2008-2009, The Inevitable Globalisation of 
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engage the jurisprudence from other jurisdictions9. The inevitable result has been 
the dilution of boundaries between “domestic law” and “foreign law” as well as 
between “international law” and “domestic law”10. Consequently, courts from 
across the globe have acknowledged and put to practice the use of foreign 
law and international law as valuable tools of interpretation11. The jurisprudence 
from countries like Ireland12, Brazil13, South Africa14, Germany15, Canada16, Aus- 
International Law, 49 Virginia Journal of International Law 985; laW, David S., 2008, Globalization and the 
Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 Northwest University Law Review 1277; ackeRMan, Bruce, 1997, The 
Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 Virginia Law Review 771, 772.
9 cleveland, Sarah H., 2006, Our International Constitution, 31 Yale Journal of International Law 1 
[Hereinafter Cleveland] [Referring to “globalisation” as one of the reasons which the justices of the US Su-
preme Court give to explain their willingness to look abroad (and towards international law) Ibid 5]; peteRs, 
Anne, 2009, Supremacy Lost: International Law Meets Domestic Constitution, 3 ICL-Journal 170  [Refer-
ring to how the convergence of international law and national constitutional law also leads to international-
ization of the constitutions of the states. In other words, this convergence does not work only at a national 
level, but possesses the tendency to seep into the constitution of the states Ibid 174]; choudhRy, Sujit, 
1999, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 
74 Indiana Law Journal 819; FosteR, Jacob, 2010, The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: 
Lessons from South Africa, 45 University of San Francisco Law Review 79 [Hereinafter Foster]; slauGhteR, 
Anne-Marie, 2000, Judicial Globalization, 40 Virginia Journal of International Law 1103 [Hereinafter Slaugh-
ter].
10 choudhRy, Sujit, 2007, The Migration of Constitutional Ideas; seipp, David J., 2006, Our Law, Their 
Law, History and the Citation of Foreign Law, 86 Boston University Law Review 1417-1446 [Hereinafter 
Seipp] [Arguing the transcendence of “rule of law” into a universal principle which cannot be bottled up and 
applied only to one nation Ibid 1442]; BuxBauM, Hannah L., 2009, Territority, Territoriality, and the Resolution 
of Jurisdictional Conflict, 57 American Journal of Comparative Law 631.
11 socaRRas, Michael P., 2011, International Law and the Constitution, 4(2) Federal Court Law Review 1; 
FoMBad, Charles Manga, 2012, Internationalization of Constitutional Law and Constitutionalism in Africa, 60 
American Journal of Comparative Law 439 [Hereinafter Fombad].
12 caRolan, Bruce, 2004, The Supreme Court, Constitutional Courts and the Role of International Law 
in Constitutional Jurisprudence: The Search for Coherence in the Use of Foreign Court Judgments by the 
Supreme Court of Ireland, 12 Tulsa Journal Comparative & International Law 123.
13 Reis FReiRe, Alonso, 2007, Evolution of Constitutional Interpretation in Brazil and the Employment of 
Balancing “Method” by Brazilian Supreme Court in Judicial Review, (7th World Congress of the International 
Association of Constitutional Law, Athens) < http://www.academia.edu/8306512/Evolution_of_Constitution-
al_Interpretation_in_Brazil_and_the_Employment_of_Balancing_Method_by_Brazilian_Supreme_Court_in_
Judicial_Review>, last seen 20/12/2017.
14 lollini, Andrea, 2012, The South African Constitutional Court Experience: Reasoning Patterns Based 
on Foreign Law, 8 Utrecht Law Review 55; Fombad, Supra 12; RautenBach, Christa, & plessis, Lourens 
du, 2013, In the Name of Comparative Constitutional Jurisprudence: The Consideration of German Prec-
edents by South African Constitutional Court Judges 14 German Law Journal 1539; FosteR 2010, Supra 
10; Bentele, Ursula, 2008-2009, Mining the Gold: The Constitutional Court of South Africa’s Experience 
with Comparative Constitutional Law, 37 Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 219; opponG, 
Richard Frimpong, 2007, Re-Imagining International law: An Examination of Recent Trends in the Reception 
in the Reception of International Law into National Legal Systems in Africa, 30 Fordham International Law 
Journal 296.
15 GRaeBneR, Riley J., 2011, Dialogue and Divergence: The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in 
German, American, and International Courts’ 42 Georgetown Journal of International Law 605.
16 schneideRMan, David, 2002, Exchanging Constitutions: Constitutional Bricolage in Canada, 40 Os-
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tralia17, Hungary18, Singapore19, Taiwan20, South Korea21, Netherlands22, Israel23 
and New Zealand24 perfectly highlights the same.
This phenomenon of cross-border judicial dialogue and engagement with 
international law manifests itself within Indian jurisprudence as well25. The In-
dian constitutional jurisprudence is disseminated with the practice of using 
foreign (non-Indian) legal authorities and international law as essential tools of 
goode Hall Law Journal 401; leFleR, Rebecca, 2001, A Comparison of Comparison: Use of Foreign Case 
Law as Persuasive Authority by the United States Supreme Court, The Supreme Court of Canada, and the 
High Court of Australia 11 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 165-191 [Hereinafter Lefler].
17 leFleR 2001, Ibid.; aRoneRy, Nicholas, 2007, Comparative Law in Australian Constitutional Jurispru-
dence, 26 University of Queensland Law Journal 317.
18 tRanG, Duc. V., 1995, Beyond the Historical Justice Debate: The Incorporation of International Law 
and the Impact on Constitutional Structures and Rights in Hungary, 28 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law 1.
19 RaMRaJ, Victor V., 2002, Comparative Constitutional Law in Singapore, 6 Singapore Journal of Inter-
national & Comparative Law 302-334.
20 chanG, Wen-Chen, 2010, The Convergence of Constitutions and International Human Rights: Taiwan 
and South Korea in Comparison, 36 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regula-
tion 594 [Hereinafter Chang].
21 Ibid.
22 Mak, Elaine, 2012, Reference to Foreign Law in the Supreme Courts of Britain and the Netherlands : 
Explaining the Development of Judicial Practices, 8 Utrecht Law Review 20-34.
23 haMMeR, Leonard M., 1998, Reconsidering the Israeli Courts’ Application of Customary International 
law in the Human Rights Context, 5 ILSA Journal International & Comparative Law 23.
24 allan, James, huscRoFt, Grant, and lynch, Nessa, 2007, The Citation of Overseas Authority in Rights 
Litigation in New Zealand: How Much Bark? How Much Bite?, 11 Otago Law Review 433.
25 Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011 [Hereinafter Vishaka] [Accepting “gender equality” to 
be a universally recognised basic human right, the court constructively relied on international law to frame 
guidelines for protection of women against sexual harassment at workplace]; Meldensohn, Oliver, 2005, 
“The Indian Legal Profession, the Courts and Globalisation” J. South Asian Studies 301; papa, Mihaela, & 
Wilkins, David B., 2011, Globalization, Lawyers, and India: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis of Globalization 
Studies and the Sociology of the Legal Profession 18 International Journal of Legal Profession 175-209; 
sMith, Adam M., 2006, Making Itself at Home: Understanding Foreign Law in Domestic Jurisprudence: The 
Indian Case 24 Berkeley Journal of International Law 218 [Hereinafter Smith] [Refers to the initial reliance 
of the Supreme Court of India on international law and the subsequent intensification of the same since 
1990s because of the fact that “the Indian Court […] amassed more power and the country [underwent] 
significant changes through its immersion in globalization.” Ibid 259]; khosla, Madhav, 2011, Inclusive 
Constitutional Comparison: Reflections on Sodomy Decision, 59 American Journal Comparative Law 909 
[Hereinafter Khosla]; deva, Surya, 2006, Human Rights Realization in an Era of Globalization: The Indian 
Experience 12 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 93; BalakRishnan, K. G., “The Role of Foreign Precedents 
in a Country’s Legal System” (Keynote Address Northwestern University Illinois 2008) < http://docs.man-
upatra.in/newsline/articles/Upload/DD0D1FD1-B18C-4240-9B41-15C5923FE819.pdf> last accessed on 
20/12/2017; BalakRishnan, K. G., “Justice in the 21st century: The challenge of Globalisation” (Introductory 
Note Qatar Law Forum 2009) <http://www.delhihighcourt.nic.in/library/articles/Justice%20in%20the%20
21st%20century%20-%20The%20challenge%20of%20globalisation.pdf> last seen 20/10/ 2017.
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interpretation and construction26. Cross-border judicial decisions, international 
law and other non-Indian sources have influenced a plethora of judicial opinions 
in India27, ranging from right to privacy28, freedom of press29, restraints on for-
eign travel30, custodial torture31, constitutionality of death penalty32, protection of 
women against sexual harassment at work place33, prior restraints on publica-
tion34 and the criminalisation of certain forms of speech and expression on the 
internet35. Unlike USA, where engaging in cross-jurisdictional constitutional dia-
logue has been looked upon with some scepticism36, the constitutional courts 
in India have accepted/adopted this practice with a lot of enthusiasm37. Even 
though the hon’ble Supreme Court of India has from time to time cautioned 
26 scotti, Valentina Rita, 2013, India: A Critical Use of Foreign Precedents in Constitutional Adjudication, 
69, in The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges [Tania Groppi and Marie Claire Ponthoreau 
(eds.)].
27 tRipathi 1957, Supra 6; sMith 2006, Supra 26; shankaR 2010, Supra 6; halpeRin 2010, Supra 6; khosla 
2011, Supra 26; aBBas, Hakim Yasir, 2013, “Critical Analysis of the Role of Non-Indian Persuasive Authori-
ties in Constitutional Interpretation” 1(II) Comparative Constitutional Law and Administrative Law Quarterly 
46, available at http://www.calq.in/sites/default/files/CALQ_1_2.pdf, last seen on 20/12/2017 [Hereinafter 
Abbas 2013].
28 Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1295 [Unauthorised police surveillance 
as considered as violative of _right to privacy’].
29 Bennett Coleman v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106 [Challenge against governmental limits on import 
of newsprint].
30 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 [Hereinafter Maneka Gandhi 1978] [Challenge 
against government’s refusal to issue passport to petitioner].
31 D. K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1997 SC 610; halaBi, Sam F., 2013, Constitutional Borrowing 
as Jurisprudential and Political Doctrine in Shri D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, 3 Notre Dame Journal 
International & Comparative Law 73-121.
32 Bachan Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 898 [Majority opinion approving of death penalty in rarest 
of rare cases].
33 vishaka, Supra 26.
34 R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1995 SC 264.
35 Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2013) 12 SCC 73.
36 RosenkRantz, Carlos F., 2003, Against Borrowings and Other Non-authoritative Uses of Foreign Law, 
1(2) International Journal Constitutional Law 269; laW, David S., & chanG, Wen-Chen, 2011, The Limits of 
Global Judicial Dialogue, 86 Washington Law Review 523; saundeRs, Cheryl, 2006, The Use and Misuse of 
Comparative Constitutional Law, 13 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 37, 39; hoWaRd 2009, Supra 8 
at 11-14; hiRschl 2010, Supra 8.
37 The evolution of Indian environmental jurisprudence by the constitutional courts is the perfect reflec-
tion of this enthusiasm. Virtually all of the Indian legal jurisprudence in relation to environmental law has 
been developed by the Supreme Court through the interpretation of Constitution and a major portion of 
this jurisprudence has relied on foreign law. The Supreme Court has developed a reputation of being an 
activist Court that has, since mid-1980s, transformed itself into a guardian of India’s natural environment; 
See Baxi, Upendra, 2003, The Avatars of Indian Judicial Activism: Explorations in the Geographies of [In]
Justice, 1 in Fifty Years of the Indian Supreme Court: Its Grasp and Reach [S. K. Verma and Kusum (eds.)]; 
Bandopadhyay, Saptarishi, 2010, Because the Cart Situates the Horse: Unrecognised Movements Underly-
ing the Indian Supreme Court’s Internationalization of International Environmental Law, 50 Indian Journal of 
International Law 204 [Hereinafter Saptarishi].
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against the disproportionate and inconsiderate use of foreign authorities and 
international law in statutory38 and constitutional39 interpretation, it has failed to 
lay down an objective test, or guidelines or proper methodology for engaging in 
such practice40.
Moreover, even though there is no doubt about the use of non-Indian per-
suasive authorities by constitutional courts, doubts and arguments have been 
raised about the manner and the extent to which the courts engage in such 
practice41. Even such practice and the doubts associated with the same man-
ifests themselves in many forms and fold42, the discussion on the same does 
not fall within the ambit of this article. This article is an endeavour to critically 
analyse the issue of comparative law’s identity crisis and it argues how the term 
“jurocomparatology” provides an answer to the same. Moreover, the article also 
discusses the benefits of engaging in such an activity and highlights how these 
benefits are already reflected within Indian jurisprudence.
Part I of the article critically analyses the problem of terminology faced by 
so called “comparative law”. It also discusses the dilemma about whether com-
parative law is a “science” or a “methodology” and explains how using a term 
like “jurocomparatology” can provide an answer to the same. Part II of the article 
discusses the benefits of using foreign law and international law for the purpose 
of constitutional interpretation and identifies how these benefits have already 
manifested themselves within Indian constitutional jurisprudence.
1. Jurocomparatology: a way out of comparative law’s terminological 
quagmire
Comparative law, a misnomer, suffers from identity crisis. And the prolifera-
tion of scholarship on the same in the last two decades seems to have deeply 
38 M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395 [As per Bhagwati CJ] “We cannot allow our judicial 
thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for that matter in any other for-
eign country. We no longer need the crutches of a foreign legal order. We are certainly prepared to receive 
light from whatever source it comes but we have to build our own jurisprudence.” Ibid at 421.
39 Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1 [The Hon’ble Supreme Court denied to apply 
the concept of “affirmative action” as it exists in U.S.A. to Indian conditions and stated that: “under these 
circumstances (where the social context in which the law is made is different), judgments from the US, while 
entitled to respect, must be approached with great caution, for their adoption would lead to jettisoning of 
over half a century of our jurisprudence.” Ibid. at 307].
40 sathe, S. P., 2003, Judicial Activism in India: Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits (2nd ed.); 
See also saptaRishi 2010, Supra 38.
41 FRankenBeRG, Gunter, 1985, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 Harvard Interna-
tional Law Journal 411 [Hereinafter Frankenberg].
42 aBBas 2013, Supra 28, at 46-73. 
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worsened the same. Comparative law’s definitional predicament is an essential 
contributor to this crisis, an issue which has not been adequately addressed by 
legal scholarship, particularly in India43. Often times comparative law, foreign law 
and international law have been used interchangeably; a practice which tends to 
jeopardise the qualitative value of the same44. Can/Should the same be done? 
If yes, then what do we mean by foreign law? How do we define the “foreign” in 
it? Should the definition be based on “territoriality” or “institutional origin” or on 
“authors’ citizenship”? Does it include everything that does not originate in the 
author’s country? Does it include international law as well? If yes, then does it 
include primary as well as secondary sources of international law?45 And how 
do we define “law” for its purposes? What does it include? Does it only include 
legislations and judicial decisions or does it also include reports of governmental 
authorities, scholarly articles/books and other judicial/legislative and quasi-judi-
cial/legislative authorities. All this signifies a much more complicated problem 
associated with the definitional issue than is originally raised or perceived. How-
ever, can we simply run away from this problem by preferring “comparative law” 
to “foreign law” because “comparative law” is broader and encompasses a lot 
more authorities than “foreign law”? It would be difficult to say so. “Compara-
tive law” has difficulties of its’ own, the fundamental being the dilemma about 
43 WateRs, Melissa A., 2007, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend towards Interpretive Incorporation 
of Human Rights Treaties, 107 Columbia Law Review 628 [Hereinafter Melissa]; WiGMoRe, John H., 1931- 
-1932, Jottings on Comparative Legal Ideas and Institutions, 6 Tulane Law Review 48; See also sMith 2006, 
Supra 26, at 225.
44 Different authors have used different terminologies to explain this phenomenon. For example, [“com-
parative legalism/constitutionalism” paRRish, Austen L., 2007, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Use of Foreign Law, University of Illinois Law Review 637; kahn, Paul W., 2003, Marbury in the Modern Era: 
Comparative Constitutionalism in a New Key, 101 Michigan Law Review 2677; [“transnational legalism/
constitutionalism” BackeR, Larry Cata, 2007-2008, God(s) Over Constitutions: International and Religious 
Transnational Constitutionalism in the 21st Century, 27 Mississippi College Law Review 11; yap, Po-Jen, 
2005, Transnational Constitutionalism in the United States: Toward a Worldwide Use of Interpretive Modes 
of Comparative Reasoning, 39 University of San Francisco Law Review 999; [“transnational judicial con-
versations/dialogues” and “quasi-constitutional arrangements” RonG & chanG 2008, Supra 8; levit, Janet 
Koven, 2004, The Supreme Court, Constitutional Courts and the Role of International Law in Constitutional 
Jurisprudence: A Tale of International Law in the Heartland: Torres and the Role of State Courts in Transna-
tional Legal Conversation, 12 Tulsa J. Comp.& Int’l L. 163]; [“legal transplants” MilleR, Jonathan M., 2003, 
A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the 
Transplant Process, 51 American Journal of Comparative Law 839; duca, Louis Del, duca Patrick Del, and 
Gentili, Gianluca, 2010, Introduction to the IALS Conference on Comparative Constitutional Law 28 Penn 
State International Law Review 293]; [“borrowing” tushnet, Mark, 1998, Returning with Interest: Observa-
tions on Some Putative Benefits of Studying Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of Constitutional Law 325]; [“trans-judicial communication/influence” slauGhteR, Anne-Marie, 1994, 
A Typology of Trans-judicial Communication’ 29 University of Richmond Law Review 99; slauGhteR 2000, 
Supra 10].
45 Does it only include treaty or conventions only? Or does it include “customary international law” and 
the ancillary sources of international law as provided in Article 38 (1) (c) and (d) of the ICJ Statute? chanG 
2010, Supra 21 [Showing how “international law” also plays a crucial role in constitutional interpretation].
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whether it is a “methodology” or a “substantive law”. This part considers these 
questions and argues that the use of a term like “jurocomparatology” can pro-
vide an answer to this definitional predicament.
1.1. Jurocomparatology: An Answer to Comparative Law’s Definitional 
Predicament
A conversation (legal or otherwise) about comparative law cannot be same 
as the one on contract law. While the latter involves a statute passed by a com-
petent legislature, containing a body of rules and regulations with the ability of 
creating legal rights, duties, obligations, liabilities, privileges, immunity, disability, 
and remedies, and capable of being enforceable in a court of law, the corpus 
juris of the former is not the same. Therefore, jurisprudentially speaking, com-
parative law cannot be treated as “law” in the strict sense of the term. So, why 
then is it called comparative “law” and what then does it deal with? If it is not a 
“law” in the strict sense of the term, then is it a “methodology” and should it be 
therefore be called “comparative analysis of law”?46 Legal scholarship seems to 
lack consensus on the same and the loose (and perhaps the wrong) manner 
in which “comparative law”, “foreign law”, “international law” and “comparative 
analysis of law” have been used interchangeably begs appropriate consideration 
and elucidation47. Utter disregard to the distinction between these phrases has 
also led some scholars to state that going into such debate would be a futile 
activity now48. The term “comparative law” as including “comparative analysis 
of law”, observes Gutteridge, “has become so firmly established that it must 
be accepted, even if it is misleading”49 However, I beg to differ with this stand 
which uses “comparative law” and “comparative analysis of law” as synonyms or 
argues in favour of using them interchangeably. They represent two different do-
mains. While “comparative law”, as will be highlighted below, is a “legal science”, 
“comparative analysis of law” reflects the application or practice of the same. In 
this sense we should think of “comparative analysis of law” as a “verb”.
46 A large number of scholars use “comparative study of law” rather than “comparative analysis of law”. 
I have deliberately used the term “analysis” rather than “study” because using “study” reflects that such 
activity is restricted only to research point of view. While as if we use the term “analysis” it will include using 
such activity from “judicial” point of view as well.
47 FRank, Daniel J., 2007, Constitutional Interpretation Revisited: The Effects of a Delicate Supreme Court 
Balance on the Inclusion of Foreign Law in American Jurisprudence, 92 Iowa Law Review 1037; Melissa 
2007, Supra 44; Msayda, Jaro, 1953, The Value of Studying Foreign Law, Wisconsin Law Review 635, 647; 
Glensy, Rex D., 2011, The Use of International Law in U.S. Constitutional Adjudication, 25 Emory Interna-
tional Law Review 197.
48 kaMBa, W. J., 1974, Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework, 23 International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 485 [Hereinafter Kamba].
49 GutteRidGe, H., 1949, Comparative Law in Kamba 1974, Ibid., at 487.
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In this regard, a broad term like “jurocomparatology” can be used to de-
fine a subject which would cover all the above aspects generally associated 
with comparative law. It should be used as a term under which “comparative 
law” and “comparative analysis of law” (and other associated aspects) could be 
brought together to mean different things. Such terminology can be used as an 
umbrella definition to cluster various aspects of “comparative law” under one 
head. Keeping this in mind and speaking epistemologically, following definition 
of “jurocomparatology” is proposed:
“Jurocomparatology may be defined as the science of 
‘comparative law’, the practice of engaging in ‘comparative analysis 
of laws’ and the practice of using ‘international law for domestic 
purposes’. For this purpose, ‘comparative law’ includes (but is 
not be restricted to) analysis, conceptualization and theorization 
of reasons as to why members of legal fraternity can or cannot (or 
should or should not) engage in legal comparison (both for research 
and practical purposes), determination of who can or cannot (or 
should or should not) engage in such comparison, defining what can 
or cannot (or should or should not) be the subject-matter of such 
comparison, identifying jurisdiction with whom such comparison 
can or cannot (or should or should not) take place, identification and 
rationalisation of legal and philosophical problems associated with 
the same, identification of methodological problems associated 
with such activity, and the development of a standard methodology 
for engaging in the same. Moreover, ‘comparative analysis of law’ 
would mean the actual act of engaging in comparison.”
1.2. Jurocomparatology: Defining the Nature and Scope
The above definition of jurocomparatology can give us a way out of the 
confusing labyrinth in which comparative legal scholarship is wedged as far as 
“conceptualising and theorizing” the nature and scope of comparative law or 
comparative analysis of law is concerned. Therefore, jurocomparatology, which 
includes comparative law as well as comparative analysis of laws, qualifies both 
as a “legal science” as well as a “legal methodology”. “Comparative law” refers 
to “legal science” in the same manner as jurisprudence and criminology50 while 
as “comparative analysis of law” refers to the actual practice of engaging in a 
50 eWald, William, 1994-1995, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review 1898, 1961-90; eWald, William, 1998, The Jurisprudential Approach 
to Comparative Law: A Field Guide to “Rats”, 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 701; valcke, 
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comparative analysis. In this sense “comparative law”, like jurisprudence, is con-
cerned about “why is” rather than “what is”. Like criminology, which tries to study 
and theorise the reasons as to “why” people commit crime, comparative law (as 
part of jurocomparatology) tries to study and theorise the reasons as to “why” 
members of legal fraternity refer to laws from other nations. The other aspects of 
comparative law may include (but is not limited to) understanding and explaining 
reasons for engaging in comparative studies, reasons as to why practitioners 
and judges prefer (or should prefer) referring to one jurisdiction over another 
while comparing, or in what circumstances can they (or should they) refer to in-
ternational law, what should or should not be the subject-matter of comparison, 
why can engaging in comparative analysis of law be challenging, how can these 
challenges be overcome, and what is the best possible methodology to engage 
in the same51. Therefore, “comparative law” deals with theorising about the act 
and about the methodology of engaging in comparative study while as “com-
parative analysis of law” means the actual act of engaging in such activity using 
the theory and the methodology developed by comparative law. For example, 
“Comparative Analysis of India’s Human Rights Law” means that I am engag-
ing in a “comparative analysis of law” and not “comparative law”. In this regard 
Prof. Kamba states that scholars like Levy-Ullman, Kohler, Arminjon, Nolde, and 
Wolff, Rabel, Brutau, Yntema, Hall and Rheinstein consider “comparative law” as 
“science” and treat it on the same line as “jurisprudence”52. Moreover, Rheinstein 
while placing comparative law in the same category as jurisprudence holds the 
view that comparative law belongs to the realm of the exact sciences “[because] 
its cultivator tries to observe, describe, classify, and investigate in their relations 
among themselves and to other phenomena, the phenomena of law. Compara-
tive law in that sense is the observational and exactitude-seeking science of law 
in general”53.
The meaning of “comparative law” under jurocomparatology suggests that 
reference to the same means indication to the domestic law (irrespective of such 
law being formal or informal, substantive or procedural, structural/institutional or 
otherwise) of a foreign country. The first question that pops up is as to whether 
“comparative law” and “foreign law” mean (or should mean) one and the same 
thing? That should not be the case. There is a structural difference between 
Catherine, 2004, Comparative Law as Comparative Jurisprudence – The Comparability of Legal Systems, 
52 American Journal of Comparative Law 713.
51 For a better idea about the nomenclature of comparative constitutional law/studies, see tushnet, 
Mark, 2014, Advanced Introduction to Comparative Constitutional Law (1st ed.).
52 kaMBa 1974, Supra 49, at 488.
53 Rheinstein, Max, 1952, Teaching Tools in Comparative Law, 1 American Journal of Comparative Law 
95, 98.
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the two. While comparative law, as highlighted above, can be classified as “le-
gal science”, foreign law seems to be the subject-matter of such science. The 
difference can perhaps be made clear by reference to the difference between 
“criminology” and “crime/criminal”. While “Criminology” refers to a specific “le-
gal science”, “crime/criminal” refers to the subject-matter of the same, i.e. they 
refer or define the “specificity” of this legal science. In the same way, “compar-
ative law” refers to a specific “legal science” and “foreign law” refers to the sub-
ject-matter of the same, i.e. it refers to the specificity of “comparative law”. The 
difference is perhaps the same as between “legal theory” and “law”.
1.3. Jurocomparatology: Defining the Subject-Matter
Having argued that “foreign law” reflects the subject-matter of comparative 
law, it becomes necessary to explain how the terms “foreign” and “law” play 
out for the purpose of comparative law. However, the question as to whether 
and why we should attempt to define these terms needs to be addressed first. 
Should we leave it to the individual scholars to define these terms for the pur-
pose of their own research and to the judges to define them on the basis of the 
facts and circumstances of each case? Or should we have a standard definition 
for these terms which could be applied uniformly to all attempts which involve 
comparative approach? This part argues that an improper use of these terms 
would lead to a compromised result, both for research as well as practical pur-
poses. Therefore, it is vital to have proper definitions of these terms. Even though 
this paper recognises the impossibility of having a universally accepted definition 
of these terms, it still considers that some degree of consensus needs to exit 
in relation to the meaning of these terms. In case there cannot be a universal 
consensus, then at least such consensus should exist at a country level. The 
scholars associated with jurocomparatology in India should at least discuss and 
decide on what should be the meaning of these terms as far as studies which 
originate in India should be considered. Moreover, at least for research purposes 
it is very important to have a certain meaning attached to these terms so as to 
bring a certain degree of “uniformity” in researches which involve comparative 
analysis of laws. If every researcher starts attaching his/her meaning to these 
terms, it will be difficult to have a qualitative literature regarding the same. For 
example, as far as using international law is concerned, some scholars con-
sider the same as part of “foreign law” while as others put them in separate 
categories. In this sense if two scholars from each category decide to take up a 
research to see how “foreign law” has been used by Indian Supreme Court, such 
researches would produce conflicting results. Moreover, it is also very impor-
tant to be specific as to what is “law” for the purpose of comparative research. 
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For example, one research may use only legislations and precedents while as 
others may use other legal material as well. Same is true in regards to what the 
courts consider as “foreign” and what they consider “law” when they engage in 
comparative judicial dialogue. Providing proper definition to these terms would 
help us to determine the nature and scope of subsequent comparative analysis, 
whether it be for research purpose or for the use by judges. This part would deal 
with the latter first. This is because the term “foreign” needs to be explained and 
understood in the context of the term “law”.
1.3.1. Law for the Purpose of Comparative Law
How do we explain “law” for the purpose of jurocomparatology? Should it 
only include the conventional sources of law like legislations and precedents? Or 
should it also include extra-legal material like governmental reports and articles 
written by foreign authors? One important reason for raising this issue is that 
the hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently uses these extra-legal materials to 
formulate judicial opinions. One may refer to Shreya Singhal v. Union of India54 in 
this regard. The counsel for the petitioner in this case referred to House of Lords 
Committee 1st Report of Session 2014-2015 on Communications titled as “So-
cial Media and Criminal Offences” in order to convince the hon’ble Supreme 
Court to save section 66A by using the “reasonable man test” as provided within 
the report55. Moreover, the scrutiny of the 38 Indian cases56 cited in Shreya Sin-
54 (2013) 12 SCC 73 (India).
55 Ibid para 48.
56 A. K. Roy & Ors. v. UOI & Ors. (1982) 2 SCR. 272; A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras (1957) SCR. 399; 
Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (1970) 3 SCR. 288; Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal (2014) 4 SCC 
257; Brij Bhushan & Anr. v. State of Delhi (1950) SCR. 605; Bennett Coleman & Co. & Ors. v. Union of India 
& Ors. (1973) SCR. 757; Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1950) SCR. 759; Director Gen-
eral, Directorate General of Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan (2006) 8 SCC 433; Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia 
v. State of Bihar & Ors. (1966) 1 SCR. 709; Dr. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte & 
Ors. (1996) 1 SCC 130; Dr. N. B. Khare v. State of Delhi (1950) SCR 519; Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia 
& Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1969) 2 SCC 166; Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Limited 
& Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1985) 2 SCR. 287; K. A. Abbas v. The Union of India & Anr. (1971) 2 SCR. 
446; Kameshwar Prasad & Ors. v. The State of Bihar & Anr. (1962) Supp 3 SCR. 369; Kartar Singh v. State 
of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569; Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962) Supp. 2 SCR. 769; Madan Singh 
v. State of Bihar (2004) 4 SCC 622; Mohd. Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (1970) 1 SCR. 156; 
R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India (1957) SCR 930; R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 
SCC 632; Ramji Lal Modi v. State of UP (1957) SCR. 860; Ranjit Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra (1965) 1 
SCR. 65; Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950) SCR. 594; S. Khushboo v. Kanniamal & Anr. (2010) 
5 SCC 600; S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan & Ors. (1989) 2 SCC 574; Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of 
India (1962) 3 SCR. 842; State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi (1952) SCR. 654; State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara 
(1951) SCR. 682; State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd. (1953) SCR. 1069; State of Karnataka v. 
Appa Balu Ingale (1995) Supp. 4 SCC 469; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad (1961) 1 SCR. 970; 
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kedia Leather & Liquor Limited (2003) 7 SCC 389; State of Madras v. V. G. Row 
(1952) SCR. 597; Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India v. Cricket Association 
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ghal case also highlights the use of these non-conventional legal authorities for 
interpretative purposes. A proper analysis of the reference to such authorities 
cited in the 38 Indian cases discussed by the hon’ble Supreme Court in Shreya 
Singhal case is provided in the following table:
S.No. Nature Details
1. Foreign Books/Authors Cited Between 40 and 50
2. Legal Classics 
– Montesquieu’s Esprit De Lois (1748).
– Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765‑1769).
– Walter Begehot’s The English Constitution (1867)
– Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law (1939 edn).
– Halsbury’s Law of England (1907).
– Meiklejohn’s Political Freedom (1960).
– HWR Wade’s Administrative Law (1961).
3.




– Yale Law Journal.
– Harvard Law Review.
– Columbia Law Review.
– Modern Law Review.
– International and Comparative Law Quarterly.
– Law Quarterly Review.
– Stanford Law Review.
Table No. 1
It is very important and at the same time very difficult to answer the question 
about what should be considered “law” for the purpose of foreign law because 
different jurisdictions recognise different sources of law and the value or cred-
ibility of each source would vary from one jurisdiction to another. Moreover, a 
comparative analysis would mean different thing to a legal researcher and to a 
judge. The consequences of the comparative analysis done by both would also 
be different. For a researcher it would perhaps mean publishing a work that pro-
vides suggestions and recommendations on the basis of comparative analysis, 
of Bengal (1995) 2 SCC 161; The Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty & Another 
(1962) 3 SCR. 786; The Superintendent, Central Prison, Fategarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia AIR 1960 SC 
633, (1960) 2 SCR 821; Zameer Ahmed Latifur Rehman Shiekh v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2010) 5 
SCC 246.
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but for a judge it would mean to create a new law or a new interpretation of law 
on the basis of the same. Therefore, while conducting a legal research involving 
a comparative approach, a scholar may not necessarily restrict himself/herself to 
conventional sources of law like a legislation or a case-law, but may very well go 
beyond and use other authorities like foreign governmental reports and articles 
written by foreign authors. Should the judges do the same as well? The above 
reference to Shreya Singhal case and the 38 Indian cases cited therein suggests 
that the judges do refer to these authorities for interpretative purposes. 
Foreign precedents are, like foreign statutes, foreign law; they are, therefore, 
not binding on a court, not even conditionally. They have only persuasive value, 
yet in this they enjoy greater acceptability than foreign statutes57.
1.3.2. Foreign for the Purpose of Comparative Law
“In multi-national states”, argues Adam Smith, “with histories of colonialism, 
occupation and/or influence by others, and increasing legal inter-connected-
ness with other countries, the line between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ for concepts 
as intangible as ‘legal principles’ has always been imprecise and is becoming 
more so.”58 “Moreover, does foreign truly imply extra-territorial provenance or 
just extra-parliamentary? Are references to tribal or indigenous law, rather than 
legislatively enacted codes, reliance on foreign law?”59 The term foreign for the 
purpose of comparative law needs to be construed in the context of the term 
“law” or “legal authorities” as discussed above. This needs to be done so as to 
avoid use of a broad definition for the same. When defined in restricted manner, 
it would be content-specific and focused and would reduce the risk of ambiguity 
and vagueness when it will be applied to law. Therefore, what should be the cri-
teria to categorise a particular legal authority as “foreign”. Should it be something 
that originates outside India (extra-territorial)? Or should it be decided on the ba-
sis of “institutional origin” (extra-institutional)? The “institutional origin” approach 
seems to be a narrow and wrong criterion. This is because in India, like else-
where, we do not have a single “law-making” institution. And using “institutional 
origin” approach as a criterion would mean that we would have to consider the 
laws originating from different legal institutions as foreign for the purpose of each 
other. The constitutional scheme in India does not authorise our Parliament to 
claim monopoly to “law-making”. It recognises other institutions, including con-
stitutional courts (the Supreme Court and various High Courts), as law-making 
bodies. Would this mean that the law made by the Legislative Assembly of one 
57 tRipathi 1957, Supra 6.
58 sMith 2006, Supra 26, at 225. 
59 Ibid.
54 VOLUME II \ n.º 1 \ janeiro 2018
DOUTRINA
state should be treated as “foreign law” for another state? Or that the decision 
of the High Court of Delhi would be considered as a foreign law for other states. 
This is not the case. Even though decisions of different High Courts only hold 
persuasive value before the other High Courts and the Supreme Court, these 
cases play a much more important role than the foreign decisions. This also 
brings to the question the legal status of the judicial decisions of the Privy Coun-
cil. Should these be considered “foreign” as well?
The right approach in this regard would be the “extra-territorial” approach. 
However, using this approach would mean that “international law” may also fall 
within the ambit of the same. And therefore, this approach needs to be applied 
with a modification. It should be utilized while expressly exempting international 
law from its domain. And the importance and necessity of doing so is reflected 
in the fact that “jurocomparatology” regards the use of international law for do-
mestic purposes as a separate category. Therefore, as far as India is concerned, 
“foreign law” for a comparative research or for the use by the judges should 
include legal authorities whose “institution of origin” is outside the territory of In-
dia. This would include foreign legislations, foreign precedents, reports of foreign 
governmental and non-governmental agencies, and articles/books written by 
foreign authors but should exclude international law.
1.4. Jurocomparatology: Justifying Use of International Law as a 
Separate Category
“Comparative law” as part of Jurocomparatology does not include any refer-
ence (direct or indirect) to international law (for interpretative purposes or other-
wise). This is done deliberately to highlight that “comparative law” should not be 
used to explain the utilization of “international law” for interpretative purposes. 
The necessity of doing so is entrenched in the structural and operational differ-
ences between foreign law (which is the subject matter of comparative law) and 
international law. The analysis of these differences will show that “international 
law” cannot and should not be placed within the category of “comparative law”. 
Moreover, “international law” cannot even be placed under “comparative anal-
ysis of law”. This is because of the nature of “comparison” as an activity. When 
we say “comparative analysis of law”, it means comparing “foreign law” from two 
different jurisdictions. And, as will be highlighted below, that is not how interna-
tional law interacts with domestic law. The interaction between international law 
and domestic law is not a comparison per se.
International law, as is the common knowledge, as a matter of both prin-
ciple and practice exists and works in a different manner than domestic law. 
Therefore, foreign law (which basically is the domestic law of a foreign nation) 
55VOLUME II \ n.º 1 \ janeiro 2018
The Muddled Science of Comparative Law: Mending Terminology and Mapping its’ 
Benefits within Indian Constitutional Discourse \ Hakim Yasir Abbas
and international law cannot be used for the purpose of comparison in the same 
sense. In fact, we cannot even say that we can use “international law” for the 
purpose of comparison. It therefore becomes important to clarify for the purpose 
of this paper that any material (empirical or otherwise) making reference to inter-
national law would mean international law in the strict sense of the term [Article 
38 (1) of the ICJ Statute].
The necessity of analysing foreign law (as a subject-matter of comparative 
law) and international law differently is reflected in the global scholarship regard-
ing the same and a large number of scholars have prearranged “foreign law” 
and “international law” into two different categories for the purpose of identify-
ing them as non-domestic interpretative authorities60. The reasons for doing so 
have been attributed to the “structural” and “functional” differences between the 
two systems (as embedded in the monist/dualist debate). Due to the paucity of 
space, these differences can be briefly stated as follows:
a.  The primary structural differences between domestic law and international 
law include law & policy making institutions and law enforcement mech-
anisms. The source of international law is different from that of domestic 
law. Every nation has specific legal institutions for the purpose of creating 
and implementing law. While as no such well defined institutional set-up 
exists for the purpose of international law. Therefore, a legislation passed 
by the US parliament or a case-law decided by a US Supreme Court 
would not have same legal sanctity as an international convention or an 
ICJ decision. The institutional similarity between India and US makes it 
convenient for Indian courts and scholars to refer to US law (foreign law) 
than making reference to international law which interacts with Indian 
law in a different capacity. Therefore, assuming that using an internation-
al convention (for the interpretative purposes of domestic law) would be 
similar to using US legislation or case-law (for the same purpose) would 
be illogical and would not yield qualitative results. Therefore, it cannot 
be said that while referring to non-domestic interpretative authorities, the 
“foreign law” and the “international law” could be considered, compared 
and used in the same way. 
b.  The second and much more important difference is in relation to the dem-
ocratic legitimacy of domestic laws and the lack of same in international 
law. This in fact has raised serious concerns about using international 
60 neuMan, Gerald L., 2006, International Law as a Resource in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 Harvard 
Journal of Law & Public Policy 177; Glensy, Rex D., 2010, Constitutional Interpretation through Global 
Lens, 75 Missouri Law Review 1171; lyon, Beth, 2007-2008, Tipping the Balance: Why Courts should 
Look to International and Foreign Law on Unauthorized Immigrant Worker Rights, 29 University of Pennsyl-
vania Journal of International Law 169; cleveland 2006, Supra 10.
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law for domestic purposes. The crux of this difference is that since the 
domestic law as well as foreign law originate in a democratic set-up, it is 
convenient to compare them than doing so with international law.
c.  Another difference is in relation to the subjects and the subject-matter of 
both systems. While the subjects of domestic law are “individuals” and 
“corporations”, international law governs “states” and “international or-
ganisations”. Therefore, the nature or subject-matter of both these sys-
tems in relation to rights, duties, privileges, power, immunity, disability and 
liability will be different and cannot be used for interpretative purposes in 
the same manner. While domestic law uses these concepts in relation to 
individuals, “international law” uses it in relation to states. Of course, there 
are instances where international law uses these concepts in relation to 
individuals as well. However, the manner in which it is done is different 
from that of in which domestic law does the same. International law cre-
ates obligations on the States to behave or not to behave in a certain 
manner in relation to other states and as in some cases in relation to their 
citizens. This suggests that while “foreign law” creates a “horizontal au-
thority” (persuasive), there may be instances where international law may 
create “vertical authority”. Therefore, this similarity in relation to subjects 
and subject-matter between two different countries (like US and India) 
makes it convenient for courts to refer to “foreign law” rather than “inter-
national law”.
d.  This brings us to the manner of interaction of international law and for-
eign law with our domestic law. In this regard one may refer to the book 
“The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges”, which is an 
empirical study of the extent and the manner in which judges use foreign 
precedents in constitutional cases in more than ten jurisdictions.61 It dis-
tinguishes “international law” from “foreign law” and expressly excludes 
“international law” from the research. While referring to why “international 
law” was excluded from the ambit of the book, the authors state the fol-
lowing:
“The use of international law has also been excluded from the 
research: […] we strongly believe that reference to international 
case law can divert attention from the optional and purely ‘voluntary 
horizontal dialogue’ between courts, by introducing elements of 
‘vertical compulsory dialogue’.”62
61 GRoppi, Tania, and ponthoReau, Marie Claire (eds.), 2013, The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitu-
tional Judges (1st ed.).
62 Ibid 5.
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Even though the term “foreign” does refer to things which originate outside 
one’s country and in that sense international law is also foreign or alien, however, 
the basis of classifying international law as a non-domestic authority should not 
be “territory”, it should be “authority”. And this authority is article 38 (1) of the 
Statue of ICJ. Unlike “foreign law”, the nature of law which falls under article 38 
of the Statue of ICJ is such that it tends to interact with the domestic law and 
should not therefore be considered “foreign”. Let us take an example. When 
United States of America enacted its patent law, it had no legal affect whatso-
ever on other countries and for these other countries this law became “foreign 
law”. However, when TRIPS agreement came into being, an obligation was cre-
ated (with certain exceptions) upon the member states to modify their domestic 
laws so as to bring them in tune with TRIPS agreement. In this sense, we cannot 
say that “TRIPS Agreement” is “foreign law” in the same sense as US patent 
law. This obligatory nature of “international law” as opposed to “foreign law” is 
also evident from state practice. An example in this regard is the Constitution 
of South Africa which states that the courts “must” use international law for the 
purpose of constitutional interpretation and they “may” use “foreign law” for such 
purposes63. All this may perhaps also explain the preferable treatment of “foreign 
law” over “international law” by courts in India64. 
Therefore, when one looks to international law, it is more in the sense of 
something being obligatory or something which tends to create liability. While as, 
when we look at foreign law, it is persuasive for all practical purposes. Therefore, 
it would be correct to state that “comparison” can take place in relation to “for-
eign law” and not necessarily in relation to “international law”. Moreover, it should 
be kept in mind it is not necessary that the extent and the manner in which 
courts rely on “international law” will be same to that of “foreign law”. Both play 
a constructive role as important tools of interpretation but such role varies in de-
gree and manner. It simply means that the manner in which the courts may use 
“international law” for interpretative purposes many not be same as the manner 
in which “foreign law is used”65. And it is for this reason that the “use of interna-
tional law” is considered as a separate category under “jurocomparatology”. In 
63  South African Constitution, s. 39
 Section 39(1) of the South African Constitution states:
  (1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum
       (a) ……
       (b) must consider international law; and 
       (c) may consider foreign law.
64 sMith 2006, Supra 26.
65 In order to see the relevance of the interaction between domestic legal system and international law 
see WateRs, Melissa A., 2005, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in 
Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 Georgetown Law Journal 487.
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this regard, the nature and scope of “Jurocomparatology” may be explained with 
the help of following diagram66
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2. Mapping the benefits of jurocomparatology within indian 
jurisprudence67
Our knowledge (information) about our own social, geo-political and cultural 
milieu exceeds our familiarity with that of the foreign set-ups. Being born and 
having grown in a specific culture, we become familiar with its’ intricate realities 
and lies, we appreciate some aspects of it while we dislike and criticise others, 
and on certain occasions, we may even assume our culture to be superior to 
others. For the members of the legal fraternity, this mind-set also includes simi-
lar preconceptions about legal and political set-up of their respective countries. 
While it is good to know ones’ own culture (legal or otherwise), it has been 
argued that acquaintance with single culture limits our understanding about a 
great number of things68. Exposure only to a single legal system could lead to 
an insulated and distorted opinion about the same and could seriously jeopard-
ise the development of one’s researching, law-making, lawyering and judging 
dexterity. Engaging in cross-border judicial dialogue or taking up a comparative 
study of laws/constitutions facilitates beneficial engagement of other patterns of 
thought and organization different from those we are familiar with. In this sense, 
jurocomparatology has long been recognized as a valuable tool for interpreting 
and reforming domestic law internally69, harmonizing and unifying law trans-na-
tionally70, and interpreting and constructing international law71. It also facilitates a 
bottomless supply of data with which to test philosophical, economic, sociolog-
ical, and anthropological theories about law, to name only a few72. By studying 
different legal cultures, we are exposed to different –patterns of order that shape 
people, institutions, and the society in a given jurisdiction73.
67 The benefits enlisted here are not limited to comparative constitutionalism alone. Comparative analy-
sis in relation to ordinary statues would also attract these benefits. 
68 hoWaRd 2009, Supra 8, at 40 [He draws an analogy between language and constitutional law. Refer-
ring to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, who said that a man who has no acquaintance with foreign languag-
es knows nothing of his own, Howard makes a similar argument about constitutional law]; schadBach, Kai, 
1998, The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European View, 16 Boston University International 
Law Journal 331, 335 [Hereinafter Schadbach].
69 dehousse, R., 1994, Comparing National and EC Law: The Problem of Level Analysis, 42 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 761, 762-63; tallon, 1969, Comparative Law: Expanding Horizons, 10 Jour-
nal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 265, 266; MoRRoW, 1951, Comparative Law in Action, 3 Journal 
of Legal Education 403.
70 GoRdley, J., 1995, Comparative Legal Research: Its Function in the Development of Harmonized Law, 
43 American Journal of Comparative Law 555; sacco, R., 1991, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to 
Comparative Law, 39 American Journal of Comparative Law 343.
71 GReen, 1967, Comparative Law as a Source of International Law, 42 Tulane Law Review 52.
72 hill, J., 1989, Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory, 9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
101, 111-13.
73 GRossFeld, Bernhard, & eBeRle, Edward J., 2003, Patterns of Order in Comparative Law: Discovering 
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Prof. Kamba argues that the failure of legal fraternity to appreciate the func-
tions and benefits of jurocomparatology (though he used “comparative law” 
instead of jurocomparatology) has seriously hampered its’ development as an 
effective tool of interpretation and reform74. “One of the main factors”, he argues, 
“that has impeded [the] progress [of] comparative legal studies [has been] the 
absence of a systematic and comprehensive treatment and appreciation of the 
functions of comparative law”75. He then states that “the clarification of [juro-
comparatology’s] function is, therefore, necessary for an appreciation of its value 
and importance”76. Keeping this in mind and for the sake of convenience, this 
part discusses the functions and benefits of jurocomparatology under following 
categories: 
A. Intellectual use of jurocomparatology. 
B. Gains for methodology. 
C. Law reforms. 
D. Judicial process. 
E. Comparative method and development of international law. 
2.1. Intellectual use of Jurocomparatology
The benefits of jurocomparatology begin with the attainment of knowledge 
of another legal system in order to enhance the understanding of one’s own sys-
tem77. The knowledge of alternative answers to common legal problems inevi-
tably provides novel ways to understand and solve problems in one’s own legal 
system78. The first achievement of comparative legal studies is the accumulation 
of knowledge79. Comparative study of law familiarizes law students, teachers, 
law makers, lawyers and judges with a global overview of law by introducing 
them to major legal families. This is true about India as well where majority of 
law schools engage in comparative study of legal systems like common law, civil 
law and so on. Unfortunately, my own experiences as a law student and now as 
a law teacher present a tale of ineffective use of comparative law as a teaching 
and Decoding Invisible Powers, 38 Texas International Law Journal 291, 292.
74 kaMBa 1974, Supra 49, at 489.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 schadBach 1998, Supra 69, at 335; GRaziadei, Michele, 2009, Legal Transplants and the Frontiers of 
Legal Knowledge, 10 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 693.
78 schadBach 1998, Ibid.
79 zWeiGeRt, Konard, & kotz, Hein, 1998, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd ed.) in Schadbach, 
Supra 69, at 336.
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tool. Kai Schadbach argues that while comparative law courses should primarily 
focus on teaching civil and common law system due to their dominance, the 
other important legal families’ such as Islamic law80, East Asian law, and African 
law81 should not be ignored82.
Learning another system not only increases the quantity of knowledge, but 
is a value addition qualitatively as well. Jurocomparatology challenges the law-
yer’s knowledge about his/her own system, forces him/her to introspect about 
the law under consideration as well as his/her approach and may ultimately lead 
to enlightenment. In analysing the underlying policies of the different systems, or 
the reasoning of the two approaches, the lawyer gains a more comprehensive 
understanding of his/her particular system83 and the law in general. Furthermore, 
the simple awareness of alternatives enlarges the lawyer’s intellectual stock, 
making him/her analytically better trained and more adept in dealing with com-
plex legal questions within his/her own legal system. Distance from all-too-fa-
miliar legal system provides perspective, enabling the comparativist to gain a 
broader and more critical view from a higher vantage point84. In this manner, 
jurocomparatology enlarges the “supply of solutions” to legal problems85. 
Viskaha’s case86 can serve an example here. This case involved a matter re-
lating to sexual harassment of women at workplace. There was no statutory law 
to deal with such a situation87 and the Supreme Court of India was faced with 
a challenge to ensure the protection of women at workplace. The court relied 
upon international law while laying down guidelines for the protection of women 
against sexual harassment at workplace. Recognising that such a problem was 
common to a number of jurisdictions, the court looked towards the efforts made 
to deal with the same on international level. The court then framed guidelines on 
the basis of the international law mechanism. The court stated as follows: 
80 david, Rene, 1983, On the concept of “Western” Law, 52 University of Cincinnati Law Review 126, 
131; MayeR, Ann Elizabeth, 1987, Law and Religion in the Muslim Middle East, 35 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 127.
81 Mattei, Ugo, 1997, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and the World’s Legal Systems, 45 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 5, 11.
82 schadBach 1998, Supra 69, at 337-338.
83 ReiMann, Mathias, 1996, The End of Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject, 11 Tulane Europe-
an & Civil Law Forum 49, 59.
84 lepaulle, Pierre, 1921-1922, The Function of Comparative Law – With a Critique of Sociological Juris-
prudence, 35 Harvard Law Review 838, 858.
85 JuenGeR, Friedrich K., 1993, American Jurisdiction: A Story of Comparative Neglect, 65 University of 
Colorado Law Review 1; aBRahaMson, Shirley S., & FischeR, Michael J., 1997, All the World’s a Courtroom: 
Judging in the New Millennium, 26 Hofstra Law Review 273, 287.
86 vishaka, Supra 26.
87 The Indian Parliament has now passed “The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, 
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (No. 14 of 2013)” and it came into force on 9th December 2013.
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“In the absence of domestic law occupying the field, 
to formulate effective measures to check the evil of sexual 
harassment of working women at all workplaces, the contents 
of international conventions and norms are significant for the 
purpose of interpretation of the guarantee of gender equality, right 
to work with human dignity in Articles 14, 15, 19 (1) (g) and 21 
of the Constitution and the safeguards against sexual harassment 
implicit therein. Any international convention not inconsistent with 
the fundamental rights and in harmony with its spirit must be read 
into these provisions to enlarge the meaning and content thereof, 
to promote the object of constitutional guarantee.”88
In this sense, it has been argued that comparative law studies in law schools 
would benefit the law students vocationally, juristically and politically89. A large 
number of scholars have also stated that comparative approach should be pro-
jected into the whole legal educational training, after the students have been 
exposed to the broad principles and backgrounds of the world’s legal systems90. 
In the same vein, a report of the Organizing Committee of the International As-
sociation of Comparative Law urged in 1949 that “law students should, at the 
end of their studies, be aware of the diversity of legal conceptions and systems 
in the world”91. The 1950 London Conference on Comparative Law (UNESCO) 
suggested very seriously the establishment in law schools of special chairs for 
the instruction of their faculty and students in foreign law92. The value of com-
parative law as part of legal education has been very well recognised in Western 
countries. In this regard Cappelletti states: 
“The interest in comparative studies in American law schools is a 
response to the increasing relevance of foreign law to the concerns 
of lawyers and their clients on a shrunken, interdependent globe. 
Both as professionals and as leaders in the public and private 
88 vishaka, Supra 26, at para 7.
89 Mayda, Jaro, 1953, The Value of Studying Foreign Law [1953] Wisconsin Law Review 635, 647 [Here-
inafter Mayda].
90 iReland, Gordon, 1933-1934, The Use of Decisions by United States Students of Civil Law, 8 Tulane 
Law Review 358; hazaRd, John N., 1951, Comparative Law in Legal Education, 18 University of Chicago 
Law Review 264; schlesinGeR, Rudolf B., 1954, Teaching Comparative Law: The Reaction of the Customer, 
3 American Journal of Comparative Law 492; valcke, Catherine, 1995, Legal Education in a “Mixed Juris-
diction”: The Quebec Experience, 10 Tulane European & Civil Law Forum 61; BeRnaBe-RieFkohl, Alberto, 
1995, Tomorrow’s Law Schools: Globalization and Legal Education, 32 San Diego Law Review 137.
91 Mayda 1953, Supra 90, at 646.
92 Ibid.
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sectors, lawyers in the West participate in a continual institutional 
reconstruction of the relevant world. Now that their relevant world 
embraces both the Common Law and the Civil Law . . . a familiarity 
with other people’s law is indispensible to an adequate legal 
education.”93
In regards to the importance of jurocomparatology for legal education, Prof 
Kamba signifies three basic objectives of legal education and then argues that 
comparative legal studies in law schools would help promote these objectives94. 
The three objectives of legal education highlighted by Prof, Kamba are: (1) It 
must cultivate the attributes and skills which are needed by lawyers; (2) It must 
provide the student with a sound knowledge and proper understanding of the 
principles and techniques of national law; and (3) It must provide the student 
with a broad-based education95. He then states that “[jurocomparatology] is es-
pecially suited to promote these objectives. When one is confined to the study 
of one’s own law within one’s own country and, thus within one’s own cultural 
environment, there is a strong tendency to accept without question the various 
aspects (norms, concepts, institutions) of one’s own legal system”96.
Jurocomparatology gives the law students an opportunity to realise that the 
tools and techniques that they use in studying law are not the only tools and 
techniques. Prof. Kamba states following in this regard:
“The discovery of other legal possibilities, not only stimulates 
the students’ curiosity and imagination, but puts into question 
the solutions of his national law. The student is compelled to 
question the soundness of the solutions, norms and many other 
aspects of his own law, to inquire into the whys and wherefores 
of the institutions. He is prompted to question and investigate the 
inarticulate assumptions on which the institutions of his own law 
rest. All this must inevitably lead to reflection, to the development 
of a critical mind, and to new insights into his own legal system.”97
However, it is unfortunate to note that “comparative law” as a subject or 
“comparative method” as a tool of study in India is still in its nebulous stage. An 
93 cappelletti, “Preface” in J. Merryman & D. Clark, 1978, Comparative Law: Western European and 
Latin American Legal Systems vii cited in FRankenBeRG 1985, Supra 42.
94 kaMBa 1974, Supra 49, at 491.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 kaMBa 1974, Supra 49, at 492-93.
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analysis of the curriculum of various law schools in India shows that there is no 
law school in India which has “comparative law” as a main/compulsory subject 
or even as an optional one. However, a majority of law schools use comparative 














1. National Law  





Comparative studies are subject‑specific. It 
means that a comparative analysis is taught as 
a part of a law subject and not as a separate 
subject. The university website lists following 
subjects in which comparative technique is used. 
These are 
Constitutional Law‑II [4th Tri‑Semester], 
Constitutional Law‑III [5th Tri‑Semester], 
Family Law – I [5th Tri‑Semester], 
Labour Law – I [11th Tri‑Semester], 
Administrative Law [7th Tri‑Semester], 
and Insurance Law [12th Semester]98. 
One significant feature in relation to comparative 
law is the single credit course on International 
and Comparative Environmental Law99. This 
extensive program provides opportunities for stu‑
dents to know the contemporary developments 
in various fields of environmental law.
• Post‑graduate Course100
The law school provides LLM in Business law 
and Human Rights Law. Following subjects, 
which involve comparative analysis and interna‑
tional law, are compulsory for both the groups:
1.  Legal System and Democratic Governance: 
Comparative Perspective, and 
2.  Changing Conception of Justice & Globalised 
Legal Order.
Following subjects, which involve comparative 
analysis and international law, are taught to 
Business law group: 
1.  International & Comparative Law of IPRs, and
2.  International Trade Law.
Following subjects, which involve comparative 
analysis and international law, are taught to 
Human Rights law group:
1.  Refugee and International Human Rights Law,
2.  International Criminal Law, and 
3.  International Human Rights Law.
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2. National Academy  
of Legal Studies  
and Research,  
Hyderabad
No No
The university website does not provide 
information about the subjects taught at the 
undergraduate level except that all the subjects 
taught at this level are the ones prescribed by 
Bar Council of India as mandatory subjects. 
No reference is made as to kind of technique 
adopted by the teachers while teaching these 
subjects101.
However, at post‑graduate level Comparative 
Public Law/Systems of Governance and Law 
and Justice in a Globalising World are taught as 
compulsory subjects102.




Centre for Comparative Law, NLUD provides a 
Seminar Course on Comparative Law to graduate 
as well as undergraduate students103.
At the post‑graduate level, following subjects are 
taught as compulsory subjects:
1. Comparative Public Law 
2. Law and Justice in a Globalizing World.
The other seminar courses which involve com‑
parative techniques and international law are as 
follows104:
1. Comparative Constitutional Law.
2. Comparative Rights Adjudication.
3.  Contemporary Challenges in International 
Human Rights Law.
4. International Business Law.
5. International Commercial Arbitration.
6. International Commercial Law.
7. International Economic Law.
8. International Investment Law.
9. International Taxation.
10. Private International Law.
11. Regulation of International Trade in Goods.
12.  Trade Remedies under International and 
Indian Laws.





Following mandatory are provided to LL.M. 
students irrespective of the choice of 
specialization:
1.  Comparative Public Laws/Systems of 
Governance.
2.  Law and Justice in a Globalising World. 
The University also has an online law journal 
titled “Comparative Constitutional Law and 
Administrative Law Quarterly”106.
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5. Dr. Ram  
Manohar Lohiya  




The university provides one‑year LL.M. and 
same involves studying following subjects/
topics: Comparative Political & Civil Rights, 
Comparative Administrative Law, Comparative 
Study of Delegated Legislation, Comparative 
Environmental Law, International Environmental 
Law, International Humanitarian Law, 
Comparative Judicial Process, Comparative 
Copyrights and Patents Law and International 
Perspective of Human Rights107.
6. Gujarat National  




At this level, Comparative Constitution is 
provided as a seminar (optional) paper108.
• Post‑graduate Level109
The university provides specialization in four 
areas:  
A) Corporate and Business Law;  
B) International Comparative Law;  
3) Intellectual Property Laws; and  
4)  Constitutional and Administrative Law. 
Following subjects associated with 
jurocomparatology are mandatory for all 
groups:
1.  Comparative Public Laws/Systems of 
Governance.
2. Law and Justice in a Globalising World.
7. National University  
of Juridical Sciences, 
Kolkata 
? ?
The University website does not provide any 
analysis of its under‑graduate and post‑graduate 
course curriculum. 
The website does make reference to the School 
of Private Laws & Comparative Jurisprudence. 
However, there are no details provided regarding 
the same110.
8. National Law  




At the under‑graduate level, the university 
provides following subjects which may be said 
to be connected to comparative law. These are 
Common Law in India, International Trade & 
Finance, International Trade Law, International 
Criminal Law, Law and Globalisation, 
International Environmental Law and 
International Taxation Law111.
The university also provides non‑credit course 
on Comparative Jurisprudence, International 
Commercial Arbitration, and Global Terrorism112.
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At the under‑graduate level, there is 
no reference to the comparative law or 
jurocomparatology. 
The university provides LL.M. in two subjects:  
1) Corporate and Commercial Law; and  
2) Constitutional and Administrative Law.  
Two subjects associated with jurocomparatology 
are compulsory to both groups:  
A)  Comparative Public Law/Systems of 
Governance; and 
B)  Law and Justice in Globalised World. 
Moreover, comparative constitutional law 
is one of the 10 optional subjects in the 
Constitutional and Administrative Law 
group113.
98  99  100  101  102  103  104  105  106  107  108  109  110  111  112  113
98 Undergraduate Programs, National Law School of India University Bangalore, available at www.nls.
ac.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=40&Itemid=25, last seen on 23.06.2017.
99 Ibid.
100 Postgraduate Programmes, National Law School of India University Bangalore, available at https://
www.nls.ac.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=810&Itemid=38, last seen on 23.06.2017.
101 Undergraduate Study, NALSAR University of Law, available at https://www.nalsar.ac.in/undergradu-
ate-study, last seen on 23/06/2017.
102 Postgraduate-Study-In-Law, NALSAR University of Law, available at https://www.nalsar.ac.in/post-
graduate-study-law, last seen on 23.06.2017.
103 The details regarding the Centre are based upon author’s interview with Prof. M. P. Singh who is the 
founding professor and the present chairperson of the Centre.
104 Optional Seminar Courses, NLU Delhi, available at http://www.nludelhi.ac.in/acd-osc.aspx, last seen 
on 23/06/2017.
105 Admissions, National Law University Jodhpur, available at http://www.nlujodhpur.ac.in/courses_
pg.php, last seen on 23/06/2017.
106 Home, Comparative Constitutional Law and Administrative Law Quarterly, available at  http://www.
calq.in/, last seen on 23/06/2017.
107 Curriculum, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University Lucknow, available at http://www.rmln-
lu.ac.in/llm.html, last seen on 23/06/2017.
108 Undergraduate Programme, Gujarat National Law University, available at http://www.gnlu.ac.in/ug-
programme.php, last seen on 23/06/2017.
109 Postgraduate Programme, Gujarat National Law University, available at http://www.gnlu.ac.in/pgpro-
grammellm.php, last seen on 23/06/2017.
110 Academics, The WB National University of Juridical Sciences, available at http://www.nujs.edu/nu-
js-academics-courses.html, last seen on 23/06/2017.
111 List of Subjects – B.A.LL.B. (Hons.), The National Law Institute University Bhopal, available at https://
www.nliu.ac.in/courses/ballb/subjects-ballb.html, last seen on 23/06/2017.
112 Non Credit Courses, The National Law Institute University Bhopal, available at https://www.nliu.ac.in/
courses/non-credit/non-credit-main.html, last seen on 23/06/2017.
113 LL.M. programme, National Law University Odisha, Cuttack, available at http://nluo.ac.in/ll-m-pro-
gramme/, last seen on 23/06/2017.
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It becomes pertinent to make reference to Centre for Comparative Law at 
National Law University, Delhi. The Centre was started in 2013 under the chair-
personship of Prof. M. P. Singh, who teaches comparative constitutional law to 
the post-graduate students at NLUD. The Centre provides a Seminar Course 
on Comparative law to both graduate as well as undergraduate students. The 
Indian Yearbook of Comparative Law is a publication of the Centre which is taken 
up as yearly based project in collaboration with Oxford University Press.
2.2. Gains for Methodology
Research is an integral tool of legal profession. Members of legal fraterni-
ty use research to find law, to dissect it, and to ensure “constant refinement 
and extension of […] knowledge of law”114. “Jurisprudence” as a law subject 
has a close relationship with comparative law. All schools of jurisprudence-the 
historical, the sociological, the philosophical, the analytical etc. – rely on com-
parative research as part of their practical endeavours. It is impossible to see 
how jurisprudence can exist without comparative law115. Every member of legal 
profession, be it students, teachers, lawyers, judges, NGOs etc., uses research 
to accomplish his/her respective task/s. In the same way, jurocomparatology is 
equally important to a legal scholar-be he a legal historian, legal sociologist, or 
social scientist seeking to discover and formulate scientific “laws” of legal evolu-
tion and development or laws about-the correlation between the law and other 
social phenomena, i.e., the construction of generalisations modelled after those 
of the natural sciences116.
2.3. Law Reforms117
No society is perfect. Neither are the laws which govern such societies. The 
dynamicity of society necessitates the enactment of new laws and the repealing 
or up-gradation of the old ones. New generations need new laws, which are 
either enacted or are simply the modified version of older laws. Moreover, in 
situations where the competent legislatures fail to upgrade the law, the constitu-
tional courts step-in to fill the loopholes or vacuum created. Law reforms are one 
114 ynteMa, 1956, Comparative Legal Research: Some remarks on “Looking out of the Cave”, 54 Michi-
gan Law Review 899.
115 paton, 1973, A Textbook on Jurisprudence, 41 (4th ed.).
116 kaMBa 1974, Supra 49, at 494.
117 Whelan, Darius, 1988, The Comparataive Method and Law Reform, LL.M. thesis, National Univer-
sity of Ireland available at https://www.academia.edu/1930168/The_Comparative_Method_and_Law_Re-
form?auto=download, Retrieved on 10/03/2016.
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area where comparative law has and continues to play a very crucial role. This 
is particularly evident from the manner and extent to which institutions like the 
Law Commission of India and the National Human Rights Commission rely on 
foreign law and international law in their reports118. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
of India has extensively relied on foreign and international law to bring about a 
large number of reforms to our legal system.
There are a number of legal problems faced by societies all around the globe. 
However, such problems do not arise simultaneously in all these societies. This 
difference in time (as to the appearance of a problem) necessitates the effective 
manner in which comparative legal techniques can be used. For example, the 
Constitution of India came into operation almost 170 years after the Constitution 
of America. During these 170 years the American Constitution was amended a 
number of times and faced a lot of challenges. So when our Constitution makers 
referred to American Constitution, they only borrowed those provisions which 
had effectively worked in America and rejected those which they felt were con-
troversial and created problems. The inclusion of “procedure established by law” 
instead of “due process” within Art. 21 of our Constitution is a perfect example. 
It was on the advice of Justice Frankfuter of the U.S. Supreme Court that the In-
dian Constituent Assembly incorporated “procedure established by law” instead 
of “due process” within our Constitution. In this regard, Manoj Mate argues as 
follows119: 
“Frankfurter had a lasting impression on Rau, who upon his 
return to India, became a forceful proponent for removing the 
due process clause, ultimately convincing the Drafting Committee 
118 See in particular National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) Annual Report 2002-2003, Re-
trieved from http://nhrc.nic.in/Documents/AR/AR02-03ENG.pdf on 10/07/2016; National Human Rights 
Commission Annual Report 2003-2004, Retrieved from http://nhrc.nic.in/documents/ar/ar03-04eng.pdf 
on 10/07/2016; National Human Rights Commission Annual Report 2004-2005, Retrieved from http://
nhrc.nic.in/Documents/AR/AR04-05ENG.pdf on 10/07/2016; National Human Rights Commission An-
nual Report 2005-2006, Retrieved from http://nhrc.nic.in/Documents/AR/Annual%20Report%205-6.pdf 
on 10/07/2016; National Human Rights Commission Annual Report 2006-2007, Retrieved from http://
nhrc.nic.in/Documents/AR/Annual%20Report%2006-07.pdf on 10/07/2016; National Human Rights 
Commission Report 2007-2008, Retrieved from http://nhrc.nic.in/Documents/AR/NHRC-AR-ENG07-08.
pdf on 10/07/2016; National Human Rights Commission Report 2008-2009, Retrieved from http://nhrc.
nic.in/Documents/AR/Final%20Annual%20Report-2008-2009%20in%20English.pdf on 10/07/2016; Na-
tional Human Rights Commission Report 2009-2010, Retrieved from http://nhrc.nic.in/Documents/AR/
NHRC_Annual_Report-09-10_Eng.pdf> 10/07/2016; National Human Rights Commission Report 2010 
– 2011, Retrieved from http://nhrc.nic.in/Documents/AR/NHRC%20FINAL%20English%20Annual%20
Report-2010-2011.pdf on 10/07/2016; National Human Rights Commission Report 2011-2012, Re-
trieved from http://nhrc.nic.in/Documents/AR/NHRC_FINAL_English_Annual_Report_2011_2012.pdf on 
10/07/2016.
119 Mate, Manoj, 2010, The Origins of Due Process in India: The Role of Borrowing in Personal Liberty and 
Preventive Detention Cases, 28 Berkeley Journal of International Law 216 [Hereinafter Mate].
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to reconsider the language of draft Article 15 (now Article 21) in 
January 1948. In these meetings Rau apparently was able to 
convince Ayyar, the crucial swing vote on the committee, of the 
potential pitfalls associated with substantive interpretation of due 
process, which Frankfurter had discussed extensively with Rau. 
Ayyar, in ultimately upholding the new position on the floor of 
the Assembly in December 1948, supported removing the due 
process clause on the grounds that substantive due process 
could ‘impede social legislation’. With the switch in Ayyar’s vote, 
the Drafting Committee endorsed Rau’s new preferred language-
replacing the due process clause with the phrase ‘according to the 
procedure established by law’, which was apparently borrowed 
from the Japanese Constitution.”120
This clearly shows that over a period of 170 years certain issues arose in 
regards to the operation of “due process clause” in America. However, we sub-
sequently saw the Supreme Court of India incorporating “due process” within 
Indian constitutional jurisprudence121.
In relation to enacting new laws and modifying old ones, comparative law 
assists the legislators in the following ways:
•  Firstly, since comparative law involves the study of another society along 
with its laws, same helps the legislator to look at the domestic problem 
from a different prospective. 
•  It then helps the legislator to understand how the law was used by another 
country as a tool to deal with the problem. In this regard, the legislator will 
also understand the effectiveness of law as a tool of social engineering. 
•  Since legal drafting is different from drafting in general and requires special 
skills, comparative study of laws will help the legislator in the drafting of 
new law as well. 
•  Comparative legal study will also help the legislator to understand the reac-
tion that the law may face from ordinary public and will help them to make 
necessary arrangements.
Professor Kamba has classified the above into three categories: (1) Use of 
Comparative law in the creation of new rules and solutions or modifying or abol-
ishing existing ones; (2) Employment of comparative legal study and research in 
120 Ibid. at 222.
121 Gandhi, Maneka, 1978, Supra 31.
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legislation and law reform in regard to the technique of drafting or formulation of 
legislation; and (3) Use of comparative technique to understand the question of 
practicability and enforceability of the proposed law122. Comparing legal systems 
facilitates implementation and prospects of success for legal reforms123. In this 
regard, Maine has declared: “The chief function of comparative jurisprudence is 
to facilitate legislation and the practical improvement of the law.”124 Legislators 
need not base their judgment on uncertain predictions. The comparativist can 
communicate the experiences of other countries with similar socio-economic 
environments, and can decide whether and how the amended or new regula-
tions influenced public behaviour. This approach not only lowers the risk of mis-
placed statutory activity (including the view that fewer regulations often lead to 
a better result among the people who are otherwise addressed by the statute), 
but also puts a minority in a legislative body in such a persuasive position that 
it increases its chances of gaining the majority. Comparative law cannot be only 
used to make or amend laws to deal with general problems. It can also be used 
as a tool to understand and improvise the existing legal institutions for effective 
administration of justice. A comparative study of the structure of Supreme Court 
of India and that of U.S.A, to analyse the effect of such set-ups on the outcome 
of dispute, by Nick Robinson is a classy example of how comparative study can 
help us better understand our own legal institutions125.
2.4. Judicial Process
One of the reasons that the courts engage in comparative practices is be-
cause often times the law under consideration before them is created using 
comparative techniques. In such cases, it is only reasonable to use comparative 
interpretation methodology to interpret the law involved. Other than this, the 
“acquaintance with the law and practice of foreign courts to fill up gaps [….] 
can be of great assistance”126. Moreover, comparative law is an invaluable tool 
for the elucidation, understanding and intelligent application in domestic courts 
of the institutions which originated in other systems of law127. “[T]he problem 
presents itself retrospectively to the lawyer or judge”, states Schlesinger, “who 
122 kaMBa 1974, Supra 49, at 496-497.
123 zaphiRiou, George A., 1982, Use of Comparative Law by the Legislator, 30 American Journal of Com-
parative Law 71 (Supp.).
124 Maine, Village Communitiee, 4 (1871) in kaMBa 1974, Supra 49, at 496.
125 RoBinson, Nick, 2013, Structure Matters: The impact of Court Structure on the Indian and U.S. Su-
preme Courts, 61 American Journal of Comparative Law 173.
126 kaMBa 1974, Supra 49, at 499.
127 Ibid.
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in applying existing law discovers that the pertinent rule is an imported one, and 
who thus may be compelled to trace its foreign antecedents”128. One of the im-
pacts of globalization on legal process is that the courts cannot leave out foreign 
law anymore. In this sense, there has been a paradigm shift, both, in the role of 
the courts as well as tools they use for interpretation. The role of the courts has 
changed from institutions that solved domestic matters to institutions that solve 
cross-jurisdictional matters. And in this process, the courts have moved from 
conventional tools of interpretation to more sophisticated tools. One of such 
tools is comparative interpretation-ism which has also been invaluable in matters 
which come before the national courts under the Conflict of Laws.
2.5. Comparative Method and Development of International Law129
Modern world is plagued with issues/problems which are common to major-
ity of nations130. The universality of these issues makes them a matter of global 
concern, necessitating efforts at global level to deal with the same131. Internation-
al law, which basically is the by-product of these efforts, is one of the important 
ways by which the international community tries to deal with these international 
issues. An essential part of this process is the employment of comparative meth-
od to understand how the nations use their domestic legal system to deal with 
these problems, what problems they encounter while enforcing these rules, and 
how these rules could be developed into universal standards/rules to deal with 
such issues. The creation of WTO and its many missions and treaties, such as 
the TRIPS agreement, can be used as an example to explain the same. Prior to 
this agreement different countries had different domestic IPR regimes. However, 
globalisation rendered these domestic IPR mechanisms useless because pro-
tection of IPRs became an international issue. This resulted in the enactment of 
TRIPS Agreement. Now all the members of WTO are required to upgrade their 
domestic laws and bring them in consonance with the minimum standards laid 
down in TRIPS Agreement. Comparative law plays a crucial role in finding these 
common rules and principles and then combing them to make international law. 
Another example is the codification of human rights law at the international level. 
128 schlesinGeR, Comparative Law Cases-Text Materials in kaMBa 1974, Supra 49. 
129 pickeR, Colin B., 2008, International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A Common/Civil Law Jurisdiction, 41 Van-
derbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1083.
130 Issues like terrorism, corruption, poverty, environmental pollution and climate change are found in all 
the nations and being matters of global concern, they can only be solved when efforts are made globally. 
See diBadJ, Reza, Panglossian Transnationalism, 44 Stanford Journal of International Law 253.
131 In this regard we can refer to SAARC as a regional organization which has made a large number of 
efforts to identify and deal with issues specific to South Asia. 
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a living document which is consid-
ered to be a direct source of law.132 In this regard, Sompong Sucharitkul states:
“[w]e can find the notion of human rights in all societies and 
at all times, in Europe as well as in Asia and Africa, in antique as 
well as in modern Chinese philosophy, in Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. The idea of human dignity is 
common to all these concepts, which emphasize different values 
according to the different conditions and diverse societies in which 
the human beings happen to be living. Human dignity and tolerance 
constitute the basic core of human rights.”133
Once comparative law technique is used to formulate international law, this 
law is used by members of international society in the interpretation of municipal 
law. In Oyama v. California134 the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Alien Land Law was contrary to the 14th Amendment, at least in so far as it for-
bade American born children of Japanese parents ineligible to naturalization to 
hold land purchased for them by parents. Four of the nine Justices experiment 
the opinion that the provision violated not only the 14th Amendment but also the 
United States obligation under the United Nations Charter. Justices Murphy and 
Rutledge JJ, in their concurring opinion stated as follows:
“This nation has recently pledged itself through the United 
Nations Charter to promote respect for and observation of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion. The Alien Land Law stands is 
barrier to that national pledge. Its inconsistency with the Charter, 
which has been duly ratified and adopted by the US, is but one 
more reason why the statute must be condemned.”135
Black and Douglas JJ, in their concurring opinion added as follows: 
“There are additional reasons why that law stands as an obstacle 
to the free accomplishment of our policy in the international field. 
One of these reasons is that we have recently pledged ourselves to 
132 suBRaManya, T. R., 1984, The Rights and Status of Individual in International Law 121 (1st ed.).
133 suchaRitkul, Sompong, 1986-1987, A Multi-Dimensional Concept of Human Rights in International 
Law, 62 Notre Dame Law Review 305, 306.
134 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948, Supreme Court of the United States).
135 Ibid 673.
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co-operate with the United Nations to promote…..universal respect 
for and observation of human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. How can 
this nation be faithful to this international pledge if state laws which 
bar land ownership and occupation by aliens on account of race 
are permitted to be enforced?”136
In relation to international human rights law, Justice Kirby writes, “[I]t is im-
portant to recognize that it is the overwhelming genetic commonality of the hu-
man species that stamps upon the discourse of human rights its search for 
universal principles”137. He is aware that certain areas of law “present quandaries 
which are common to societies at roughly the same stage of economic and 
social development”138. Similarly, the courts in Germany, Italy139, Netherlands, 
Tanzania140, Chile, Philippines and India141 have referred to and relied upon the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The following explanation will make this 
clear.
136 Ibid 649-650.
137 kiRBy, Michael D., 2000, The New Biology and International Sharing: Lessons from the Life and Work 
of George P. Smith II, 7 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 425, 434.
138 kiRBy, Michael D., 1995, International Commentaries: A Patient’s Right of Access to Medical Records, 
12 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 93, 93.
139 Ministry of Home Affairs v. Kemali, [Judgment of 1st February 1962] (Court of Cassation, Itlay) reprint-
ed in 40 ILR 191-95
140 Ephrahim v. Pastory and Kaizilege, (2001) AHRLR 236 (High Court of Tanzania) reprinted in 87 ILR 
106-110.
141 chaiRMan, Railway Board and Ors. v. Mrs. Chandrimadas, (2000) 1 SCC 265 [The Supreme Court stat-
ed that the UDHR has the international recognition as the “moral code of conduct”, having being adopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations, the applicability of the UDHR and the principles thereof may 
have to be read, if need be, into the domestic jurisprudence].
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Moreover, Article 38 of the Statute of ICJ recognises general principles of 
law recognised by civilised nations’ as one of the sources of international law. 
Therefore in an international dispute before the ICJ, a State which relies on this 
source of international law to put forth an argument needs to satisfy the burden 
of proof that such law is a general principle of law recognised by civilised nations. 
However, such burden can only be discharged by engaging in a comparative 
study142.
“Private law rules and analogies would seem to be destined to play a con-
siderable part in the future development of Public International Law and in the 
settlement of international disputes, more particularly in view of Article 38 of 
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice which directs that 
Court to apply, among other rules, ‘the general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations’. This means that general principles recognised by the main sys-
tems of private law may be applicable in the future to international disputes, and 
that such principles must be ascertained by comparative study.”143 Moreover, 
the international forums have also used comparative method to formulate their 
opinions144. Also, a large number of scholars have argued about globalisation 
of legal principles like “rule of law” and employ the same for international law 
purposes145.
142 zaJtay, Imre, 1974, Aims and Methods of Comparative Law, 7 Comparative & International Law Jour-
nal of South Africa 321, 325 [According to the assumption in article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, the aim of the application of comparative law is evident: in fact, in order 
to establish “the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations” it is indispensable for a judge-to 
go on to a comparative examination of the different national laws. It is true that the scope for the application 
of the said provision is limited, since article 38 only applies to the International Court of Justice, Ibid].
143 GutteRidGe, H. C., 1931, The Value of Comparative Law, Journal of Society of Public Teachers of Law 
26, 29; See also vespaziani, Alberto, 2008, Comparison, Translation and the Making of a Common European 
Constitutional Culture, 9 German Law Journal 547, 558.
144 kakouRis, C. N., 1994, Use of the Comparative Method by the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities, 6 Pace International Law Review 267.
145 seipp 2006, Supra 11; phillips, Lord, “The Rule of Law in a Global Context”, The Qatar Law Forum, 30 
May 2009, available at <http://www.qatarconferences.org/qatarlaw2009/english/speeches/philips_en1.
pdf> last seen on 20/07/2016; keRsch, Ken, 2004, The Globalized Judiciary and the Rule of Law, 13 The 
Good Society 17; MaRtinez, Jenny S., 2003, Towards an International judicial System, 56 Stanford Law 
Review 429.
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3. Conclusion
A proper consideration of comparative law’s definitional predicament requires 
a suitable place within any discussion on jurocomparatology. If not a universal 
solution, the predicament at least requires an answer at national level. Ignoring 
the same could seriously jeopardise the quality of research or practical applica-
tion of jurocomparatology by judges and lawyers. Jurocomparatology is a legal 
reality and the manner in which courts, particularly constitutional courts, have 
engaged with the same has been haphazard, subjective, and without any proper 
methodology. The courts should therefore develop proper methodology to en-
gage with jurocomparatology. The functional importance of jurocomparatology 
and its operation within Indian legal set-up is a factual certainty. Jurocompara-
tology has played an important role in the development of Indian legal jurispru-
dence, particularly constitutional law. However, very little research is available 
when it comes to determining the extent, the true nature and the methodology 
employed by the Indian courts while engaging in the same. The lack of such 
research creates ambiguity and uncertainty about the legal, philosophical and 
methodological issues related to cross-border judicial dialogue by Indian con-
stitutional courts and seriously compromises the quality of such engagement.
